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Determinants of Corporate Compliance with Modern Slavery Reporting  
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper investigates the determinants of corporate compliance with the Transparency in 
Supply Chains provision of the UK Modern Slavery Act. While recent scholarship has described what 
firms are doing to comply with this Act, no attempt has been made to explain their behaviour. 
Design: A predictive model of corporate compliance with modern slavery reporting is tested using 
secondary data from FTSE 350 firms. The model is informed by institutional theory and, in particular, 
by Oliǀeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϭͿ insights into the conditions under which firms respond to institutional pressures.  
Findings: Compliance with modern slavery reporting is found to be significantly related to firm size, 
prior social responsibility commitment, network involvement, industry and headquarter base (UK 
versus non-UK). Other predictors like media exposure, shareholder concentration and profitability are 
found to be non-significant.        
Research limitations: The focus is on the 350 largest publicly-listed companies in the UK. The stances 
that firms outside of this cohort are taking on modern slavery reporting still need to be investigated.   
Practical implications: Compliance with the UK Modern Slavery Act varies by industry. Regulators 
should consider this as part of risk profiling strategies and follow-up inspection of firms.    
Originality: This paper provides the first theoretically-grounded examination of the organisational and 
environmental factors that determine corporate compliance with modern slavery reporting.  
Keywords modern slavery, supply chains, corporate compliance, institutional theory, secondary data.  
Paper type Research paper 
1. Introduction 
Firms are under pressure to do more to combat modern slavery risks in their supply chains. This is the 
culmination not only of campaigning and advocacy by non-government organisations (NGOs) like Anti-
slavery International, The Ethical Trade Initiative and Stronger Together, but also the result of direct 
government intervention. The latter is exemplified through the UK Modern Slavery Act. It contains a 
Transparency in Supply Chains provision, which obliges large firms to publish an annual modern 
slavery statement setting out the steps that they have taken to de-risk their supply chain from modern 
slavery (HM Government, 2015). Research recently published in Supply Chain Management: An 
International Journal (23/2) by Stevenson and Cole (2018) described the type of information textile 
firms have included in their statements and what this implies about their preparedness for managing 
modern slavery risks. We extend this emergent line of inquiry by switching the focus from descriptive 
to predictive analysis. Specifically, we examine the conditions under which firms are likely to conform 
to institutional expectations on modern slavery reporting.  
ModeƌŶ slaǀeƌǇ is ͞the status oƌ ĐoŶditioŶ of a peƌsoŶ oǀeƌ ǁhoŵ aŶǇ oƌ all of the poǁeƌs attaĐhiŶg 
to the ƌight of oǁŶeƌship aƌe eǆeƌĐised͟ ;OffiĐe of the High CoŵŵissioŶeƌ foƌ HuŵaŶ ‘ights, UŶdatedͿ. 
In practice, this means one party forcing another party to work, controlling them through threats, 
restricting their movement, treating them as a commodity and financially exploiting them (Antislavery 
International, Undated; Crane, 2013, p. 51). By any reckoning, modern slavery has received scant 
attention in supply chain management (SCM) research (Gold et al., 2015). Apart from the previously 
cited study by Stevenson and Cole (2018) and earlier work by Winstanley et al. (2002), Crane (2013), 
New (2015) and Crane et al. (2017), there has been a distinct lack of academic engagement with 
modern slavery in supply chains. Systematic literature reviews indicate that this is part of a tendency 
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in SCM research to privilege the environmental dimension of sustainability over the social dimension 
(Carter and Easton, 2011; Touboulic and Walker, 2015; Zorzini et al., 2015). Even SCM research 
focused on social sustainability has sidestepped modern slavery (Nakamba et al., 2017).  
There is reason to believe, however, that modern slavery will assume greater prominence in SCM 
research. Media coverage of forced labour incidents in the domestic supply chains of high-street 
retailers like Next and John Lewis has heightened public awareness of the problem (www.bbc.co.uk, 
2016). What is more, the evidence suggests that modern slavery is becoming more prevalent 
domestically and internationally. In England and Wales there was a year-on-year increase of 159% in 
modern slavery offences recorded for 2016-2017 and the number of persons affected is in the region 
of 13,000 (HM Government, 2017). This pattern is mirrored internationally, with the total number of 
modern slavery victims almost doubling from 20.9 million in 2011 (ILO, 2012) to 40.3 million in 2016 
(ILO, 2017). Against this backdrop, there are growing institutional pressures – regulatory, normative 
and cultural-cognitive - on firms to be transparent over the modern slavery risks they face and their 
strategies for mitigating these risks. Inevitably, this means richer and more accessible data for 
researchers to work with. 
The particular focus of this paper is on the determinants of corporate compliance with modern slavery 
reporting. With the exception of Birkey et al. (2018), there has been no attempt to test these 
determinants. Understanding of the causes of compliance or non-compliance with modern slavery 
reporting is limited as a result. To move the debate forward we specify and test a predictive model of 
compliance with modern slavery reporting. Our model is adapted from Oliver (1991) and her insights 
into the determinants of compliance with institutional standards, of which modern slavery reporting 
is an example. We test the model among FTSE 350 firms using data from a range of secondary sources 
and databases. The paper makes its empirical contribution by providing the most comprehensive 
answer yet to the question of why compliance with modern slavery reporting varies across firms. It 
ŵakes its theoƌetiĐal ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ ďǇ applǇiŶg Oliǀeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϭͿ fƌaŵeǁoƌk foƌ the fiƌst tiŵe iŶ a 
sustainable SCM context. We operationalise this framework in the case of modern slavery reporting, 
but its utility is likely to extend to other aspects of sustainable SCM. 
Before proceeding, we wish to stress that modern slavery reporting is about more than buyer-supplier 
dyads. This is evident in the terminology used throughout the UK Modern Slavery Act, which refers to 
supply chains rather than suppliers (HM Government, 2015). It is equally evident in the content of 
modern slavery reports, many of which discuss actions taken with sub-suppliers as well as lead 
suppliers (Stevenson and Cole, 2018). Some financial institutions and travel providers even include 
customers and service users in modern slavery risks assessments (see, for example, Barclays, 2016), 
which tells us that modern slavery reporting is an end-to-end supply chain issue. The remainder of the 
paper is structured as follows. Section two presents a predictive model of corporate compliance with 
modern slavery reporting. Section three explains the methodology, including operationalisation and 
measurement of predictor and outcome variables. All data comes from secondary sources. Section 
four presents the findings from ordinal and binary logistic regression procedures used to test the 
model. The fifth section discusses the findings using an institutional theory lens. The sixth section sets 
out practitioner implications before concluding with the research limitations.  
2. Theoretical Framework  
The Transparency in Supply Chains provision of the UK Modern Slavery Act legally requires all large 
firms operating in the UK to publish an annual statement detailing their actions to prevent modern 
slavery in their supply chains (HM Government, 2015). Inter alia, firms are expected to include 
information on their supply chain characteristics, policies, due diligence, risk assessment, risk 
3 
 
management, performance metrics and training as they relate to modern slavery. The Transparency 
in Supply Chains provision represents an institutional pressure on firms to combat modern slavery. 
Institutional theory predicts that firms respond to such institutional pressure by adjusting their policies 
and practices in accordance with the expectations of institutional stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). The rationale for doing so is to maintain social 
legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 19ϳϱͿ. As the saŵe authoƌs eǆplaiŶ, ͞oƌgaŶizatioŶs seek to estaďlish 
congruence between the social values associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of 
aĐĐeptaďle ďehaǀiouƌ iŶ the laƌgeƌ soĐial sǇsteŵ͟ ;ϭϵϳϱ, p. ϭϮϮͿ. This logic can be used to explain why 
firms are placing greater emphasis on responsible sourcing practices (Hoejmose et al., 2014a).    
Institutional pressures are not deterministic of corporate behaviour in every case and firms may be 
unable or unwilling to comply. The originators of new institutionalism, Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
acknowledged that firms sometimes display supeƌfiĐial oƌ ͞ĐeƌeŵoŶial͟ ĐoŶfoƌŵitǇ ǁith iŶstitutioŶal 
rules and norms. This led Oliver (1991) to propose a contingent view of institutional pressures and 
their effects on firms. It suggests that responses to institutional pressures fall into one of five 
categories: defiance, avoidance, compromise, acquiescence and manipulation. The response type a 
firm exhibits depends on cause, constituent, content, control and context factors linked to the 
institutional pressure impacting them. Oliver (1991) explains that cause refers to the rationale for the 
institutional pressure, constituents are internal or external stakeholders exerting pressure on the firm 
to be institutionally compliant, content is the set of requirements that the firm is expected to obey, 
control is the mechanisms through which the institutional pressure is applied and context is the 
environmental setting in which the pressures play out. 
Oliver͛s fƌaŵeǁoƌk (1991) provides the theoretical basis for predicting corporate compliance with 
modern slavery institutional pressures in this study. To operationalise it we draw from research into 
the determinants of socially responsible behaviour by firms. Campbell (2007), for instance, proposed 
a number of economic and institutional conditions under which firms are likely to practise socially 
responsible behaviour. These take in control-related factors like NGO activism and regulatory 
oversight, constituent-related factors like input from labour and community groups and context-
related factors like the financial health of the firm. Within the sustainable SCM field, control factors 
such as industry peer pressure, media attention and consumer campaigning have been identified as 
driving responsible sourcing (Park-Poaps and Rees, 2010; Deegan and Islam, 2014; Kauppi and 
Hannibal, 2017). “iŵilaƌ opiŶioŶs haǀe ďeeŶ offeƌed iŶ ƌespeĐt of ͞ gƌeeŶ͟ “CM pƌaĐtiĐes. Foƌ eǆaŵple, 
Tate et al. (2011) have proposed that industry coalitions and competitor behaviour exercise forms of 
Ŷoƌŵatiǀe aŶd ŵiŵetiĐ ĐoŶtƌol oŶ fiƌŵs foƌ ͞gƌeeŶ͟ “CM.  
Research on socially responsible reporting by firms provides additional insights into probable 
determinants of corporate compliance with modern slavery reporting. Findings from these studies 
point to several organisational factors that account for if and to what extent firms report on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) issues. In this vein, support has been forthcoming for organisational 
characteristics including size, public profile and industry classification as influencing CSR disclosures 
(Reverte, 2009; Gamerschlag et al., 2011). This suggests that modern slavery as a societal problem 
could be more germane to larger, more visible firms and firms operating in industries with higher 
exposure to its risks. There is also some evidence to suggest that constituents like shareholders, 
company directors and audit committees steer firms͛ approaches to CSR reporting (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005; Barako et al., 2006; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006), as there is in relation to the profitability and 
leverage positions of firms (Perez-Batres et al., 2012). Insights from the above literatures provide the 
basis for operationalising cause, constituent, content, control and context factors as they relate to 
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corporate compliance with modern slavery reporting. Hypothesised relationships are depicted in Fig.1 
and defended in sections 2.1 through to 2.5 underneath.  
Fig. 1 Predictive model of corporate compliance with modern slavery reporting  
 
 
2.1 Cause 
Modern slavery is one of the main activist issues facing corporations. This can be seen in Anti-slavery 
International campaigns like Cotton Crimes, which urges retailers not to source cotton from countries 
where it is alleged that forced labour is used in its cultivation. It can equally be seen in the Church of 
EŶglaŶd͛s Cleǁeƌ IŶitiatiǀe, ǁhiĐh supports church networks in detecting modern slavery in their 
towns and cities (Burgess, 2018). The reputational consequences associated with modern slavery risks 
have risen as a result. Large firms are particularly affected. Whereas small firms operate under the 
institutional radar, large firms are scrutinised by government, NGOs and the media. This was 
illustrated in 2018 when the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner wrote to the top one hundred 
publicly-listed UK firms reminding them of their reporting obligations under the Modern Slavery Act 
(Office of the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, 2018). The visibility of large firms means that 
reluctance by them to signal compliance with prevailing standards on responsible SCM will invite 
public disapproval and even official censure (Hoejmose et al., 2014a). Consequently, there is more at 
stake for large firms when it comes to satisfying institutional expectations on modern slavery 
reporting. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
H1: Firm size is positively associated with corporate compliance on modern slavery reporting. 
2.2 Constituents  
Internal and external constituents can push firms to take a proactive stance against modern slavery. 
Here the focus is on two constituent groups: non-executive board directors and shareholders. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code recommends that at least half of the company board should consist of 
non-executive independent directors. This is because non-executive directors bring an outside 
perspective to organisational planning and oversight (Roberts et al., 2005). They not only monitor 
managerial decision making, but also provide advice to executive management (ibid). Their external 
and often independent status means that non-executive directors are better positioned than 
managers to represent the views of stakeholders on sustainability matters (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). 
Corporate Compliance with 
Modern Slavery Reporting 
Cause
1. Firm size
Constituents
2. Non-executive directors
3. Shareholder concentration
Content
4. Committment to social 
responsibility
Control
5. Media exposure
6. Network involvement
Context
7. Industry
8. Profitability
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This extends to combating modern slavery, where non-executives can advise on and oversee 
appropriate policies, practices and procedures. Research suggests that representing stakeholder 
interests and making corporate governance disclosures is supported by the extent of non-executive 
representation on the company board (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006), although negative findings have 
also been returned (Barako et al., 2006). On balance, non-executive representation is conducive to 
socially responsible behaviour. This leads to the following hypothesis.       
H2a: Non-executive representation on the company board is positively associated with corporate 
compliance on modern slavery reporting.      
Agency theory tells us that there are inherent tensions between the interests of owners (i.e. principals) 
and the actions of managers (i.e. agents) (Eisenhardt, 1989). How firms resolve these agency tensions 
varies according to their shareholder concentration. Firms with relatively high shareholder 
concentration prefer direct engagement with major shareholders to ease principal-agent tensions 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). Smaller numbers of shareholders and a low public ownership interest 
in the firm makes this strategy feasible. It can be witnessed, for example, when controlling 
shareholders are permitted to have a representative on the board of directors. Firms with a relatively 
low shareholder concentration, on the other hand, are reliant on formal reporting to communicate 
with and maintain the trust of their many and dispersed owners. Moreover, this is something that 
their shareholders expect. Findings from across a number of countries bear out this inverse 
relationship between shareholder concentration and social reporting (Barako et al., 2006; 
Gamerschlag et al., 2011). We anticipate that as shareholder concentration increases, the impetus for 
firms to publicly report on modern slavery risks decreases.  This leads to the following hypothesis.      
H2b: Shareholder concentration is negatively associated with corporate compliance on modern slavery 
reporting. 
2.3 Content 
The objectives of the UK Modern Slavery Act will be familiar to some firms. Guidance documentation 
accompanying the Act acknowledges as much, statiŶg: ͞aŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ ŵaǇ alƌeadǇ ďe uŶdeƌtakiŶg 
procedures or have specific policies that go some way to addressing the issue of modern slavery and 
ŵaǇ alƌeadǇ ďe disĐlosiŶg this iŶ soŵe foƌŵ͟ ;HM Government, 2015, p. 9). Studies show that 
increasing numbers of corporations are doing precisely this by adopting human rights policies and 
signing up to international accords designed to eradicate forced labour and child labour (Preuss, 2009; 
Preuss and Brown, 2012). In such cases there is prima facie compatibility between institutional 
expectations on modern slavery reporting and pre-existing corporate values and commitments. 
Compatibility of this kind makes acceptance of institutional demands palatable for firms. 
Incompatibility can cause them to evade or rebuff these same demands in order to protect their core 
operations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Notably, Birkey et al. (2018) found that firms with a history of 
social responsibility reporting made better quality disclosures under the California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act. This leads to the following hypothesis.            
H3: Prior social responsibility commitment is positively associated with corporate compliance on 
modern slavery reporting. 
2.4 Control 
Institutional pressures can take coercive, normative and mimetic forms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
As all large firms operating in the UK are obliged to report on modern slavery, coercion in a legal sense 
is invariant. Normative and mimetic institutional pressures are not invariant. The degree to which 
fiƌŵs͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐe these pressures may influence their approach to modern slavery reporting. 
Normative pressures impose a social obligation on firms to behave responsibly (DiMaggio and Powell, 
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1983). It was, for example, a sense of social obligation that prompted UK universities to embrace 
sustainability in their food supply chains (Sayed et al., 2017). While normative pressures originate from 
many sources, the media is especially germane to socially responsible SCM (Park-Poaps and Rees, 
2010) and is known to influence how firms report on it (Reverte, 2009). Media outlets, often after 
receiving alerts from NGOs, publicise incidents where corporations have been compromised by labour 
rights abuses (Deegan and Islam, 2014). A recent Sky News investigation linking child labour in 
Congolese cobalt mines to the supply chains of consumer electronics firms is a case in point 
(www.skynews.com, 2018). Media exposure of this type makes named firms vigilant about modern 
slavery risks and, arguably, more transparent about their strategies to manage these risks. This leads 
to the following hypothesis.            
H4a Media exposure is positively associated with corporate compliance on modern slavery reporting. 
Mimetic pressure takes effect when firms, uncertain over how to navigate an institutional 
environment in flux, decide to mimic or copy the behaviour of their peers (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). Mimetic pressures have an important role to play in the uptake of sustainable SCM practices, 
as demonstrated by Hoejmose et al. (2014b), Sancha et al. (2015) and Sayed et al. (2017). An important 
medium through which mimesis takes place is business networks (Tate et al., 2011). It is along 
Ŷetǁoƌks that ͞shaƌed uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs͟ emerge over how the industry should orient itself towards its 
institutional environment (Scott, 2008). Involvement in a Ŷetǁoƌk ŵeaŶs that ͞shaƌed 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs͟ iŶfoƌŵ corporate policies and practices. Applied to modern slavery, network 
involvement implies that firms can learn from their peers on how to address its causes and remedy its 
consequences. There is already evidence of this having happened in the retail sector, with major firms 
coalescing around ethical sourcing standards promulgated by the Apparel Industry Partnership and 
the Fair Labor Association (Park-Poaps and Rees, 2010). This leads to the following hypothesis.              
H4b Network participation is positively associated with corporate compliance on modern slavery 
reporting. 
2.5 Context 
Organisational context is also relevant in explaining how firms respond to institutional pressures. Two 
context-related dimensions are examined in this study. The first is industry. International Labour 
Organization (ILO) estimates point to the prevalence of forced labour in industries like construction, 
manufacturing, agriculture, accommodation and retail/wholesale (ILO, 2017). The labour intensive 
and low-skilled profile of these industries explain why they are susceptible to human trafficking and 
labour exploitation (Crane, 2013; Crane et al., 2017). Moreover, suppliers for these industries are 
often located in developing economies where legal protections for workers are negligible and modern 
slavery risks are severe (Walkfree Foundation, 2018). By contrast, finance and professional services 
industries employee predominantly high-skilled workers and have domestically-centred supply chains. 
The salience of modern slavery is likely to be less for firms in these industries, which feeds through to 
their interest in reporting on it. This is essentially what Birkey et al. (2018) found on the relationship 
between supply chain risk exposure and modern slavery reporting. Elsewhere, industry type has 
emerged as a significant determinant of how firms report on social responsibility matters (Reverte, 
2009; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Perez-Batrez et al., 2012). This leads to the following hypothesis. 
H5a Industry is deterministic of corporate compliance on modern slavery reporting. Specifically, firms 
in low-skilled, labour-intensive industries are more likely to report on modern slavery than firms in 
high-skilled, value-adding industries.  
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The second context-related dimension is resource availability. Instituting strategies to combat modern 
slavery requires firms to commit organisational resources. This can be inferred from research showing 
that firms are continually having to enhance the management of their operations and supply chains 
in response to social and environment challenges. This enhancement takes in not only structural 
adjustments like individual and team sustainability roles, but also policy changes like the adoption of 
ethical supplier codes, practice improvements like third-party audits and the expansion of 
performance reporting to include grievance, remediation and occupational health (Winstanley et al., 
2002; Preuss, 2009; Eccles et al., 2014). Firms with a surplus of funds are in a position to make the 
necessary resource investments for acting against modern slavery and subsequently reporting on 
these actions in the public domain (Perez-Batres et al., 2012). The opposite is the case for firms in a 
precarious financial position. For them, managing and reporting modern slavery risks is likely to be an 
expense they could do without. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
H5b Profitability is positively associated with corporate compliance on modern slavery reporting. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Population sample  
The population sample used in this study is the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 list. FTSE 
350 comprises the largest 350 firms by market capitalisation listed on the London Stock Exchange. The 
FTSE 350 sample was selected for the following reasons. First, its constituent members satisfy the £36 
million turnover threshold at which firms are legally obliged to publish a modern slavery statement. 
Second, there is precedent for using FTSE-listed firms to investigate environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) matters in SCM (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Preuss, 2009; Preuss and Brown, 
2012). Third, the size and marketplace presence of FTSE 350 firms means that action or inaction by 
them in combating modern slavery has ramifications for their entire supply chain.  
3.2 Data sources  
The data used in this paper is taken entirely from secondary sources. Data for the predictor variables 
was extracted from annual company reports and external databases like FAME, BoardEx and Financial 
Times Online. Data for the outcome variable was generated from an analysis of modern slavery 
statements made by firms. We explain this process in section 3.4. Secondary data is growing in 
importance in SCM research (Ellram and Tate, 2016) and can be found across many sustainable SCM 
studies (Walker and Jones, 2012; Kauppi and Hannibal, 2017). Its attractions include relative ease of 
access, opportunities for research replication and reduced likelihood of researcher or respondent bias 
skewing the eventual findings (Trzesniewski et al., 2011). It has drawbacks, too, including unstructured 
or incomplete formats and the fact that researchers have no discretion over how the variables are 
designed or measured (Ellram and Tate, 2016). In this study, data for the predictor variables was 
collected for the financial year-end 2015 and data for the outcome variable was collected for the 
financial year-end 2016. The one-year time lag was designed to obviate any concern about reverse 
causation.  
3.3 Predictor variables  
Eight predictors and a control variable were used in the model. Summary information on the 
operationalisation, measurement and data source for each variable is contained in Table 1. Unless 
otherwise stated, data was collected for the financial year-end 2015. Firm size was operationalised in 
terms of annual turnover. Non-executive representation was operationalised as the percentage of 
company board members classed as non-executive. Shareholder concentration was operationalised 
as the three highest individual shareholdings expressed as a combined percentage of ordinary share 
capital. Social responsibility commitment was operationalised by reference to firms being a signatory 
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to the UN Global Compact, UN Responsible Investment Principles and Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI) Base 
Code. Each of these international accords commits signatories to socially responsible business 
practice. Both the UN Global Compact and ETI Base Code explicitly refer to the elimination of forced 
labour and child labour. The UN Responsible Investment Principles are aimed at promoting ethical 
investment. Signatories to each accord on or before 2015 were coded 1. Non-signatories were coded 
0. 
Network involvement was operationalised as participation in named ESG networks. Networks could 
be sector-specific (e.g. International Council on Mining and Metals), cross-sector (e.g. Business for 
Social Responsibility) or established to combat labour rights abuses in particular countries (e.g. Project 
Issara in the Thai prawn sector). Corporate sustainability reports and company literature was 
consulted to identify network involvement for each firm. The number of ESG networks identified for 
each firm was taken as our measure. Media exposure was operationalised as the total number of 
Financial Times newspaper articles that mentioned a firm in the context of modern slavery between 
1996 and 2015. The Financial Times was used because of its preeminent status as the newspaper of 
record for business and economic affairs. Articles were identified by using keyword search term 
combinations of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ Ŷaŵe aŶd ͞ŵodeƌŶ slaǀeƌǇ͟ oƌ ͞Đhild laďouƌ͟ oƌ ͞foƌĐed laďouƌ͟ iŶ the 
online archive of the Financial Times. 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes were used to identify the corresponding industry for each 
firm. The fifteen industry classes relevant to our sample were mining and quarrying; manufacturing; 
utilities (electricity and water); construction; wholesale and retail; transportation and storage; 
accommodation and food; information and communication; finance and insurance; real estate; 
professional, scientific and technical; administrative; public administration and defence; human 
health; arts, entertainment and other services. Profitability was operationalised as return on total 
assets (ROTA). Headquarter location served as a control variable. It was treated dichotomously, split 
between UK-headquartered and non-UK headquartered firms. Given that the study investigates 
corporate compliance with a UK piece of legislation, it was felt that the primary jurisdictional base of 
the firm should be controlled for in the model.  
3.4 Outcome variable  
The outcome variable, corporate compliance, was operationalised as the extent to which firms 
adhered to the Transparency in Supply Chains provision of the UK Modern Slavery Act. In concrete 
terms, this meant assessing the content of modern slavery statements against seven areas the Act 
advises firms to report on. The seven areas are (1) supply chain information (2) policies for combating 
modern slavery (3) due diligence on modern slavery (4) risk assessment of modern slavery (5) risk 
management of modern slavery (6) performance measurement on modern slavery prevention and (7) 
training on modern slavery awareness. Firms with a statement that contained information on any one 
of the seven areas were scored 1, firms with a statement that contained information on any two of 
the seven areas were scored 2 and so forth. Firms with no modern slavery statement were scored 0. 
The integrity of the scoring process was ensured through the use of a coding protocol (see Table 2). 
The protocol listed indicators associated with each of the seven areas. For example, due diligence 
indicators included ͞ƋuestioŶŶaiƌes͟, ͞audit͟, ͞oŶsite assessŵeŶt͟ and ͞vetting͟. Similarly, risk 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt iŶdiĐatoƌs iŶĐluded ͞ĐoŶtƌaĐtual clauses͟, ͞supplieƌ attestatioŶs͟, ͞ƌeŵediatioŶ͟, 
͞teƌŵiŶatioŶ͟ aŶd ͞floǁ-doǁŶ pƌoǀisioŶs͟. The identification of one or more indicators discussed in 
the context of modern slavery and supply chains meant that the firm was adjudged to have reported 
on the particular area. The indicators were arrived at by consulting relevant academic literature 
(Preuss, 2009; Preuss and Brown, 2012; New, 2015; Stevenson and Cole, 2018), ex-ante assumptions 
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about what firms would report and by sampling 50 modern slavery statements prior to the scoring 
process commencing proper.  
Two researchers worked together in assessing and scoring the statements. The use of the coding 
protocol supported consistency and transparency in the scoring process. Moreover, it provides 
guidance to other researchers should they wish to replicate some or all of this study. As an additional 
check on the robustness of the approach, the compliance score for each firm was correlated with 
statement length. Statement length was measured by the number of pages. The assumption was that 
firms with higher compliance scores will have provided more information in their statements, which 
should be reflected in statement length. The assumption proved correct. The degree of correlation 
between compliance scores and statement length was 0.689, significant at p <.001. 
3.5 Compliance types 
Having completed the assessment and scoring process, firms were categorised aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Oliǀeƌ͛s 
(1991) institutional response types of defiance, avoidance, compromise and acquiescence. Defiance 
is defined as non-conformity to institutional expectations on modern slavery reporting. Firms with no 
modern slavery statement were deemed to be defiant. Avoidance is defined as tokenistic conformity 
to institutional expectations on modern slavery reporting. Firms with a modern slavery statement that 
contained information on one to three of the recommended areas were classed as avoidance cases. 
Compromise denotes partial conformity to institutional expectations on modern slavery reporting. 
Firms with a modern slavery statement that contained information on four to six of the recommended 
areas were said to be compromising. Acquiescence is defined as full conformity to institutional 
expectations on modern slavery reporting. Acquiescent firms had a modern slavery statement that 
contained information on all seven recommended areas.  
A fifth type of response – manipulation - that comprises Oliǀeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϭͿ tǇpologǇ is Ŷot iŶĐluded iŶ this 
study. The reason being that manipulation by firms in the context of modern slavery reporting would 
have occurred prior to the adoption of the Transparency in Supply Chains provision by the UK 
government. As Oliver (1991, p. 157) explains, manipulation is ǁheŶ fiƌŵs atteŵpt to ͞ ĐhaŶge oƌ eǆeƌt 
poǁeƌ oǀeƌ the ĐoŶteŶt of the [iŶstitutioŶal] eǆpeĐtatioŶs theŵselǀes͟. For instance, firms may have 
lobbied the UK government to ensure that their legal obligations did not extend beyond reporting 
their anti-slavery strategies. To gather evidence of manipulation we would need to investigate the 
industry consultation process that took place in the lead-up to the enactment of the UK Modern 
Slavery Act. However, as the scope of this study is limited to modern slavery statements it is all but 
impossible to detect evidence of manipulation. As a result, we exclude manipulation as a response 
type. We acknowledge its omission and highlight the need for future research to explore if industry 
actors manipulated institutional expectations on combating modern slavery.  
3.6 Data screening and preliminary analysis 
The dataset was screened for completeness prior to running the statistical tests. Six cases were 
removed because of missing data. An additional nine cases were removed because of duplication of 
modern slavery statements. Duplication in this instance refers to two or more entities listed on the 
FTSE 350 and covered by the same group statement (e.g. John Laing Group Plc and John Laing 
Infrastructure Fund Ltd). The final number of usable cases was 335. Descriptive statistics and 
correlations for the predictor and outcome variables are contained in Table 3. The highest Pearson 
Correlation Co-efficient value was 0.59. This indicates that multi-collinearity is not present. Tolerance 
and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) diagnostic tests confirmed this observation. Tolerance values did 
not go below 0.43 and VIFs did not go above 2.28.   
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4. Findings 
Ordered logistic regression (probit) was used to test the effect of the predictor variables on 
compliance with modern slavery reporting. Ordered logistic regression is designed for cases where 
the dependent variable contains a number of ranked categories. The corporate compliance variable 
used in this study is an example of a dependent variable with ranked categories. It goes from defiance 
(0) to avoidance (1) to compromise (2) to acquiescence (3). Had corporate compliance been measured 
at interval level we would expect to use standard linear regression. As with regression models 
generally, the purpose of ordered logistic regression is to test how accurately the dependent variable 
can be predicted by independent variables. Ordered logistic regression rests on the assumption of 
proportional odds. This means that a predictor variable is assumed to have an identical effect at each 
level of the dependent variable. For a detailed treatment of ordered logistic regression refer to 
O͛CoŶŶell (2006).   
The ordered logistic regression in this study was run using IBM SPSS Statistics 23 programme. The first 
step in the process was to assess how well the model fitted the data. Model Fitting Information 
confirmed that the final predictive model was a significant improvement on the intercept-only model 
;Χ = ϭϲ7.96, df = 24, p <.001). The model was found to explain over 42% of the variance in compliance 
with modern slavery reporting (Nagelkerke = 0.429). Maximum likelihood methods were used to 
estimate the parameters of the model. Parameter estimates indicate which predictor variables are 
statistically significant in explaining compliance. Cumulative odds ratios for the predictor variables 
were also calculated using SPSS Output Management System (OMS). Odds ratios give the odds that a 
predictor variable has a higher or lower value on the dependent variable. Parameter estimates and 
cumulative odds are reproduced in Table 4.  
We start our presentation of findings with variables that did have a statistically significant effect on 
compliance. Firm size is significant at p <.10. This gives qualified support to H1, which argues that the 
institutional visibility of larger firms puts them under pressure to take a proactive stance against 
modern slavery. Also as hypothesised, prior social responsibility commitment increases the likelihood 
that firms respond positively (p <.01).  Specifically, signatories to the UN Global Compact are almost 
twice as likely to comply with modern slavery reporting as non-signatories. Significant associations 
were not observed for either the UN Responsible Investment Principles or ETI Base Code. For the 
former, this can be explained by most of its signatories operating in the finance and insurance sector 
which, as will be described below, exhibited low levels of reporting compliance. Network involvement 
is the strongest predictor of compliance (p <.01). The likelihood of network participants conforming 
to modern slavery reporting requirements is 2.18 times that of non-participants (95% CI, 1.60 to 2.99). 
As H4b contends, network involvement acts as a source of mimetic or peer pressure on firms to enact 
institutionally-sanctioned business practices.  
Industry is also sigŶifiĐaŶt iŶ eǆplaiŶiŶg fiƌŵs͛ staŶĐe oŶ ŵodeƌŶ slaǀeƌǇ ƌepoƌtiŶg, ǁhiĐh Hϱa 
predicted. Compared with finance and insurance, which serves as the reference category, 
manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail, accommodation and food, transport and other 
industries besides are more likely to give effect to the reporting requirements of the UK Modern 
Slavery Act. In fact, with the exception of real estate, public administration and mining all other 
industries have a higher probability of compliant behaviour than finance and insurance. This extends 
up to a three-time probability in the case of manufacturing and accommodation industries. These 
industry effects indicate that the salience of modern slavery to firms depends on their business model, 
employee profile and supply chain configuration. Headquarter location also matters. UK-
headquartered firms are almost 1.5 times as likely to demonstrate compliance as non-UK 
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headquartered firms. Evidently, proximity to the institutional rule setter, in this case the UK 
government, engenders compliant behaviour.     
Other results go against hypothesised predictions. Non-executive representation on company boards 
is significantly but negatively related to compliance. The expectation was that a positive relationship 
would exist. Subsequent investigation of this surprising finding traced its cause to the many instances 
of investment firms with exclusively non-executive boards not publishing a modern slavery statement. 
H2b predicted that shareholder concentration would be inversely related to compliance. While an 
inverse relationship is observed it is not statistically significant. Media exposure was hypothesised to 
induce compliance on the basis that it represents a normative pressure on firms. No support was 
forthcoming, leading to rejection of H4a. Possibly, the operationalisation of media exposure relied on 
in this study was too narrow and needed to include sources other than newspapers. Finally, 
profitability is not associated with compliance and so H5b is rejected. This runs contrary to prevailing 
thinking on the relationship between financial resources and responsible business practice. We discuss 
it and the other negative findings in section 5.  
4.1 Binary logistic regression 
A second round of statistical tests was undertaken to examine the effect of the predictor variables on 
the likelihood of a firm either acquiescing, compromising, avoiding or defying modern slavery 
reporting requirements (see Table 5). This involved treating each of the four compliance types as 
dichotomous variables and then regressing them on the same set of predictor variables using binary 
logit models. As with the ordered logistic regression, maximum likelihood procedures were used to 
estimate the parameters of each logit model. Each of the four models was significant at p <.01 or 
better. The variance explained ranges from 15% in the case of compromise to 66% in the case of 
defiance. The lowest prediction accuracy rate across the four models is 66.9% and the highest is 91.6%. 
The results from the logit models offer nuance by isolating the statistically significant factors 
associated with each of the four discrete response types. The findings to emerge from this exercise 
are set out below. 
Acquiescence with modern slavery reporting requirements is primarily associated with firms that are 
signatories to UN Global Compact and involved in ESG networks. This implies that an acquiescent 
stance has its antecedents in, first, how congruent the UK Modern Slavery Act is with pre-existing 
corporate objectives and values and, second, the mimetic control mechanisms that the firm 
experiences. These represent the content and control dimensions of our model, respectively. By 
contrast, the compromise stance is linked to non-participation in networks and the type of industry. 
In respect of the latter, firms in industries like accommodation/food, construction, manufacturing, 
professional/scientific, wholesale/retail and transport are more likely to assume a compromise stance.  
The only statistically significant characteristic of avoidance category firms is that they have low levels 
of non-executive board representation. Having fewer non-executives deprives firms of external and/or 
independent advice on managing their social responsibilities. The reason the original hypothesis was 
not supported becomes apparent when we isolate the characteristics of firms in the defiance category. 
These firms have high levels of non-executive representation on their company boards. When we 
investigated the matter further we found that 70% of defiant firms operated in the finance and 
insurance sector. It is common for investment firms to operate with small, entirely non-executive 
boards. This explains the anomalous result. Finally, defiant firms are, on average, smaller in size. As 
hypothesised, smaller size means reduced institutional visibility; and reduced institutional visibility 
means less onus to be institutionally compliant or more licence to be defiant. 
4.2 Findings summary 
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The analyses presented above lead to two main conclusions. First, corporate responses to institutional 
pressures for modern slavery reporting are not uniform. They sit on a continuum that stretches from 
negative (defiance) to positive (acquiescence). Second, several organisational and environmental 
factors influence the position that firms occupy on this continuum. Mainly, these relate to fit or 
alignment between combating modern slavery and a fiƌŵ͛s eǆistiŶg soĐial ƌespoŶsiďility orientation, 
the mimetic controls a firm is exposed to, the industrial context in which it operates and its size and 
headquarter location. There are also some factors that are specific to individual response types such 
as non-executive representation in the case of defiance and prior social responsibility commitment in 
the case of acquiescence. Taken together, the findings provide reasonable support to Oliǀeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϭͿ 
thesis that how firms respond to institutional pressures is contingent on cause, constituents, content, 
control and context factors.  
5. Discussion 
Modern slavery is beginning to insert itself into SCM research, evidenced by recent assessments of 
the quantity and quality of information that firms are disclosing in their modern slavery statements 
(Stevenson and Cole, 2018). The purpose here has been to extend this nascent line of inquiry by testing 
the determinants of corporate compliance with modern slavery reporting. It represents among the 
first studies of its kind, with only Birkey et al. (2018) having previously investigated why US retailers 
adopt certain stances towards the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act. The findings of our 
study reveal that FTSE-listed firms have not responded uniformly to institutional expectations on 
modern slavery reporting. Even more importantly, our findings go some way towards explaining why 
this is the case. We discuss our findings below using Oliver͛s (1991) institutional theory framework for 
predicting corporate responses to institutional pressures.  
5.1 Theoretical confirmation 
Several of Oliǀeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϭͿ theoretical assumptions about what promotes institutional compliance 
receive empirical support in our study. Among these is compatibility between organisational values 
and the content of institutional pressures. FTSE firms who have made a commitment to uphold human 
rights by joining the UN Global Compact are more compliant with modern slavery reporting. For such 
firms we can deduce that there is a compatibility, or even complementarity, between their espoused 
stance on socially responsible SCM and the ethical values that the UK Modern Slavery Act 
promulgates. Compliance is made easier as a result. Another theoretical assumption is that mimetic 
control mechanisms, which are proxied in this study by network involvement, pushes firms towards 
institutional compliance. Our finding that FTSE firms involved in ESG networks are more compliant is 
consistent with this assumption. Essentially, networks facilitate the diffusion of best practices and 
cause firms to coalesce around a behavioural standard (Campbell, 2007; Tate et al., 2011). Some FTSE 
corporations allude to this point in their modern slavery statements. Tesco Plc, for instance, claims 
that participation in the UK Stronger Together initiative ͞offeƌs a suppoƌt Ŷetǁoƌk ǁheƌe ĐhalleŶges 
and good practice can be shared among peers and experts͟ (Tesco, 2016). 
Context is central to understanding how firms react to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). We find 
strong evidence of its role here. Specifically, context in the form of industry classification influences if 
and to what extent firms report on modern slavery. Even though firms across all industries are obliged 
to report, their fulfilment of this requirement varies substantially. One reason for this is the level of 
modern slavery risk that industries face (ILO, 2017; Walkfree Foundation, 2018). Industries with high 
risk exposure will devote greater resources to address modern slavery compared to industries with 
lower risk exposure. This explains why manufacturing firms are over-represented in the acquiescence 
category and why finance and insurance firms are over-represented in the defiance category. The final 
theoretical assumption confirmed relates to the connotations of the UK Modern Slavery Act. Previous 
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research indicates that where institutional pressures have moral connotations, which is the case here, 
larger firms are expected by institutional stakeholders to demonstrate compliance and lead by 
example (Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Hoejmose et al., 2014a). Our finding that larger firms produce 
better modern slavery reports supports this reasoning.    
Other theoretical assumptions about what promotes institutional compliance were not supported. 
Normative pressure stemming from media exposure did not affect corporate compliance with modern 
slavery reporting, which is contrary to what has emerged elsewhere on the adoption of sustainability 
practices in SCM (Park-Poaps and Rees, 2010; Sayed et al., 2017). It may be because we confined our 
operationalisation of media exposure to newspaper coverage of firms. A more expansive 
operationalisation that takes in coverage by other stakeholders – NGO press releases, for example - 
might better capture its effect. Profitability also had no effect on compliance. This is noteworthy as 
financial strength has been shown to be an antecedent of CSR activity and disclosure across a number 
of studies (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Chih et al., 2010; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Perez-Batres et al. 
2012), although negative results can also be found (Barako et al., 2006; Reverte, 2009). Conceivably, 
it is less financial resources than intangible resources like organisational culture that spur firms 
towards developing and subsequently reporting on modern slavery strategies. Further research is 
advised to probe the role of both tangible and intangible organisational resources on responsible SCM 
practices.   
Institutional constituents, as Oliver (1991) noted, press firms into particular ways of acting. 
Assumptions in this study about the role of constituents in driving compliance with modern slavery 
reporting go unsubstantiated. Non-executive presence on company boards yielded a negative effect 
and shareholder concentration yielded no effect. This suggests that we should look beyond 
shareholders and directors to other stakeholder groups like suppliers, customers and investors when 
investigating the drivers of compliance with modern slavery reporting. We return to this point in 
section 6.2.   
5.2 Contributions 
This study makes empirical and theoretical contributions to the SCM field. Empirically, it presents 
important new findings on the factors that explain corporate responses to institutional demands for 
transparency over modern slavery risks in supply chains. Some of these findings confirm our a priori 
assumptions. Other findings confound them. Taken together, the study and its findings build on 
current SCM lines of inquiry into modern slavery specifically (Gold et al., 2015; New, 2015; Birkey et 
al., 2018; Stevenson and Cole, 2018) and socially responsible sourcing generally (Zorzini et al., 2015; 
Nakamba et al., 2017). Theoretically, our opeƌatioŶalisatioŶ aŶd testiŶg of Oliǀeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϭͿ fƌaŵeǁoƌk 
on corporate responses to institutional pressures is novel for sustainable SCM research. While SCM 
scholars have used institutional pressures to rationalise why firms attempt to make their supply chains 
͞gƌeeŶ͟ oƌ ethiĐal (Tate et al., 2011; Hoejmose et al., 2014b; Sancha et al., 2015; Kauppi and Hannibal, 
2017; Sayed et al., 2017), we go down a different path by testing the effect that various organisational-
environmental factors have on corporate responses to these pressures. In doing so we demonstrate 
how institutional theory can be used in new ways for researching sustainable SCM phenomena.     
6. Conclusion 
This study has sought to advance knowledge on modern slavery in a SCM context by examining the 
determinants of corporate compliance with the Transparency in Supply Chains provision of the UK 
Modern Slavery Act. Its findings point to the contingent nature of compliance with modern slavery 
reporting, showing that factors as diverse as cause, context, constituents, content and control have a 
part to play in how firms respond. This is a novel insight for the field, an insight that is grounded in 
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institutional theory. The study goes some way towards redressing the paucity of evidence on the 
implications of modern slavery risks for supply chains (Gold et al., 2015; New, 2015) and builds on 
existing attempts at conceptualising and theorising modern slavery as the phenomenon of interest 
(Crane, 2013; Crane et al., 2017). Its contribution is timely given the growing prevalence of modern 
slavery in developed and developing economies and a corresponding insistence from political, 
religious, business and labour leaders that every effort must be made by firms to counteract it.     
6.1 Managerial and policy implications 
The paper has a number of managerial and policy implications. Senior managers committed to socially 
responsible supply chains should explore the option of joining a network like AIM-Progress or signing 
up to an international accord like the UN Global Compact. Either of these actions will generate positive 
momentum behind organisational efforts to deal with modern slavery risks. At public policy level, the 
Office of the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner should take note that some of the largest 
publicly-listed firms in the UK have yet to produce a modern slavery statement. Over 70% of these 
non-compliant firms are in finance and insurance. Ostensibly, finance and insurance firms are 
unaffected by modern slavery risks. However, as the Financial Action Task Force (2018) makes clear, 
the risk of the proceeds of modern slavery crime entering the financial system is high. Hence there is 
a case for stronger government intervention with this sector. Ultimately this may mean bringing civil 
proceedings in the High Court against firms for persistent non-compliance.  
Modern slavery reporting is a step in the right direction for responsible SCM. The challenge now for 
policy makers is how to maintain progress. One option is to make firms include modern slavery metrics 
in the governance section of their annual company report. Relevant here could be number of supplier 
audits carried out, number of complaints received through whistleblowing channels, number of 
supplier contracts terminated etc. This would have the advantage of standardising modern slavery 
reporting, ensuring modern slavery risk metrics reach a wider audience of stakeholders and making it 
easier for all stakeholders to observe year-on-year improvements by firms in managing modern 
slavery risks. A final policy implication is to do with the effects of modern slavery strategies on smaller 
actors in the supply chain. Certain FTSE 350 firms require their tier one suppliers to pay UK Living Wage 
rates, adopt modern slavery policies and give guarantees about tier two suppliers͛ ethiĐal ĐƌedeŶtials. 
This could prove challenging for small firms in terms of cost competitiveness and administrative 
workload. For this reason policy makers need to be alive to the unintended consequences of 
introducing the Transparency in Supply Chains provision and monitor its impact.  
6.2 Limitations and future research 
There are limitations to this study. First, it confines its analysis to the largest 350 publicly-listed firms 
in the UK. The determinants of reporting compliance outside of the FTSE 350 cohort go untested. 
Future research may want to consider sampling some other of the approximately seven thousand 
large firms in the UK, including universities, which fall under the remit of the UK Modern Slavery Act. 
It would also be instructive to check the external validity of the findings by replicating the study in 
Australia. Its Modern Slavery Act, which includes legal reporting obligations for corporations, came 
into force on January 1st 2019. Second, the paper tests institutional determinants of compliance with 
modern slavery reporting but not economic-efficiency determinants. The latter also shape how firms 
respond to demands made of them by regulators and professional bodies (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
To account for economy-efficiency determinants, it is recommended that future studies survey firms 
on the financial costs and benefits of creating an organisational architecture for combating modern 
slavery. These cost and benefit factors would then be hypothesised to impede and promote 
compliance, respectively.          
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Third, the specification and operationalisation of variables used in this study can be improved on. We 
have already conceded that operationalising media exposure exclusively in terms of newspaper 
articles overlooks normative pressure emanating from NGO activism. Substituting newspaper articles 
with a more expansive measure of media coverage such as Thomson Reuters ESG controversy scores 
is one way forward. There is also scope to introduce alternative predictor variables into the model. 
For instance, public sector buying organisations are a constituent group that could influence private 
sector compliance with modern slavery reporting. The working hypothesis is that the higher the 
proportion of revenue a firm derives from public sector customers, the more pressure it is under to 
exhibit compliance. Finally, it should be noted that the study uses the inaugural modern slavery 
statements published for the financial year-ending 2016. It is probable that compliance will improve 
in the second and subsequent years of reporting as firms become attuned to institutional standards. 
This is a conclusion Stevenson and Cole (2018) also reached. Therefore, re-testing the predictors of 
compliance with modern slavery reporting over the coming years is recommended.  
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